University at Buffalo School of Law

Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-1988

The Line Between History and Casenote
John Henry Schlegel
University at Buffalo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
John H. Schlegel, The Line Between History and Casenote, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 969 (1988).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/709

© 1988 Law and Society Association. Reproduced with permission.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

THE LINE BETWEEN HISTORY AND
CASENOTE

JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL
When Kermit requested that I write an essay for this Review,
an ambiguity in his letter led me to inquire whether he wanted me
to write about legal history written in the twentieth century or
legal history written of the twentieth century.' Unraveling that
ambiguity had the queer effect of deflecting my attention from the
fact that I was in the process of agreeing to write about a subject
that seemed to me to be close to nonexistent. To check out that
perception, I sent my super-diligent research assistant out to
search the relevant periodical literature published during the last
fifteen years. A bit to my surprise he came back with a longer bibliography than I had expected and the observation, "I had a difficult time deciding where to draw the line between history and
casenote." It seems to me that this observation just about sums up
the problem and perhaps it is important to discuss that problem as
we look at this largely nonexistent field in the hope that by the
time there is a field there may no longer be a problem.
And just what is the problem of which I speak? I have written of it in detail elsewhere so I will limit myself to a summary
(Schlegel, forthcoming). Put straightforwardly legal history is a
species of intellectual history, by which I mean that the principle
professional actors in the legal system-lawyers and other public
officials--are intellectuals, people who do things with ideas. That
leads to the problem because intellectual history as usually written
is a history of ideas simpliciter and legal history, a history of legal
doctrine. Thus follows my research assistant's observation. Since
the standard issue casenote often provides a history of the relevant
doctrine, just where is the line between legal history and the casenote?
I wish to assert that (ironically) there is a "bright line" between the two. If the job of the historian is to render the past intelligible, then the task of the legal historian is to render the legal
past intelligible, a past of legal texts-not just written words, but
This essay is written for Willard Hurst who has led us all, even those who
have chosen another way. Thanks are due to Fred and to the rest of the usual
cast of characters, Rob and Guyora, as well as my research assistant Bruce
Ikefugi.
1 This essay covers material published in the past fifteen years. I have
intentionally chosen not to write about matters of legal thought and legal education because I am too close to both topics.
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legal actions as well--and that job can only be done by rendering
that text in the fullness of its context. The rationale behind this
ukase is that texts are not self-defining. Words are truly arbitrary
in their relationship to things and other words, and are thus understood conventionally-by convention of a group of users, the socalled hermeneutic circle. Thus, as an historical matter, a text can
only be understood within the context provided by the circle of individuals for whom that text had meaning. From this follows the
bright line between history and casenote, for the latter assumes
that texts are self-defining, or more accurately that the relationship of text to reader is unproblematic in that all legal texts speak
with an obvious voice to all legally literate readers so that there is
never a need for the explicit delineation of context and at most minor, if pesky, problems of interpretation.
While most readers will understand that my ukase renders
traditional doctrinal legal history problematic, (not impossible, because one can always hypothesize a context for a text and thus
render that text meaningful), a moment's thought should indicate
that it simultaneously renders a purely social history of law
equally problematic. Social history is founded on the notion that
social actions are intelligible preliterately, without the aid of
words. That assertion is extremely dubious. Actions as texts are
meaningful only within a context with the aid of which meaning
can be constructed and that context, of necessity, must include
(and here I will surely insult some member of the Association)
words, for without words actions cannot be rendered, except by
mimesis, much less rendered meaningful. Thus, a social history of
law needs to take explicit account of the narrowly legal things,
such as statutes, cases, treatises, law suits, theoretical works, however reported or made available to the relevant social actors, that
made the actions meaningful. The result, in either case, is a fully
socialized intellectual history.
A brief example may clarify all of this. Consider for a minute
the civil rights movement. A history of the sit-in, except as either
an art form or a branch of military strategy and tactics, would be
nothing but a chronicle without a full understanding of the law of
public accommodations as understood by the participants: the
demonstrators, their leaders and their lawyers, their opponents,
and the various publics at large. Simultaneously, a history of civil
rights doctrine would be nothing but a casenote without fully taking into consideration the experiences of the individuals, i.e., the
lawyers, leaders and demonstrators, their opponents, and the various publics, for whom these texts had, and who thus gave these
texts, meaning.
Now, there are a few examples of this socialized intellectual
history for the twentieth century. In a recent essay I reviewed one
such book, Kalman's Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960 (1986). But
it is basically a bad practice to set up an unknown standard and
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then to measure work done previously by that standard. So, given
the limited amount of work in the field, generally, and the even
more limited number of full length studies, I shall eschew the
comparative game. Rather, I would like to look at an old chestnut,
periodization, and then turn to particular topics.
It is surely a truism that any historical periodization is largely
dependent on the purpose for which it is created. This observation, when added to the equally common one, long the staple of
the social historian, that continuities always overwhelm change,
generally leads sensible historians to eschew periodization debates.
However, no one has ever accused me of being sensible, and only a
few of being an historian, so I am going to attempt to begin a periodization dispute.
Just when does twentieth century legal history begin? The
question seems so trivial, yet, I think it goes to the essence of what
is understood as the twentieth century. Let me toss out four dates:
1865, 1887, 1898, and 1918. If the twentieth century is defined by
the continuing, unresolved struggle over civil rights for blacks in
the United States, then it began at Appomattox. If the key issue is
the confrontation of the United States with nationally-effective
corporate economic power, the century began sometime around
the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act. If the twentieth century is about our adventure as an international political and economic power, then it begins with the Spanish-American War. And
if the central problem is America's brief and inconclusive flirtation
with national direction of economic and social life, than our entry
into World War I is the start of the twentieth century.
Each date is defensible. The dominant social problem in this
country is, and has been, at least since the civil war, race. Yes,
there have been problems with immigration in general, and the
immigration of Catholics and Jews in particular, and there has
been a great and persistent problem with industrial labor that at
its root is, I think, more social than economic. But the great issue,
so great that for a long time it was taken for granted and treated
as taboo, is race. The problem was raised differently in the North
and South. In the North, geographic isolation was possible and allowed for informal enforcement of the underlying cultural norms,
while in the South, the inability to create viable geographic isolation led to more formal systems of norms. But in both cultures,
the underlying norm was subordination and was enforced by the
legal system, either explicitly or simply by acting on the basis of
the cultural norm. Erecting and beginning to dismantle the system of norms has taken generations of work that is yet to be completed.
The task of coping with nationally-effective corporate economic power required first that it exist. The completion of the
transcontinental railroad and the admission of the last two conti-
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nental states to the union are the outer boundaries of the initial
effectiveness of such power, I suppose. But the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act is a convenient starting point. At least by
1887 there was enough of a problem that we behaved as if there
were a national problem, and we have done so ever since. From
the creation of corporate forms sufficiently secure to allow the mobilization of European capital, to the creation of the Trust to maximize economic power; from the use of the Constitution to maximize corporate freedom, to its use to establish effective national
standards of conduct; from the use of vast governmental bureaucracies to police corporate action, through the creation of pinpointed economic incentives to induce corporate action, to the creation of a tax system that can only be described as regulatory in
intent, law has been at the center of the struggle over economic
power in the United States. And this is a struggle that is anything
but over, as financial institutions continue to lose their local character, as plant relocation and growth in white-collar jobs plays
havoc with organized labor, as deregulation decreases locallyowned businesses, and as knowledge of environmental relationships turns local problems into national ones.
The role of law in the international adventures of the United
States is less well known, but arguably these adventures, first creating an imperium and then acting out the assigned social role of
the imperial power, are what most distinguishes any of the last
ninety years of American history from its predecessors. It is a
classic tar-baby story as contemporary issues demonstrate. The
search for markets and resources has led to a situation where the
decline in exports to those markets, enforced in an attempt to
shore up lending institutions in the United States, has created a
trade deficit that engulfs the entire economy. Similarly, the exercise of strategic power has created dependencies in Europe that
make it impossible to disengage there and require increasing engagement elsewhere, not to mention the domestic economic crunch
that would follow any serious decline in engagement such as to significantly reduce so-called defense spending. Here, beyond the obvious international norms, one must recognize the vast range of
private legal devices that create and secure international economic
relations. The great apparatus of national law that manages the
export and import of foodstuffs and munitions, to mention only
two key items, and the sheer legal ingenuity that turned an attack
on a small boat into the justification for a war in which 600,000
died, or that transformed Kuwaiti tankers into American tankers
so that we could defend our boats, are part of the role of law in
our licit and illicit international affairs.
The assertion that the twentieth century began twenty years
late is probably tough to swallow, but the notion that national direction of economic and social life of this century is the centerpiece of the legal history makes some sense. Much economic regu-
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lation takes place beginning with the Plymouth colony, but
national regulation requires a nation, by definition. A government
that had subsisted on customs duties and excises until the adoption
of the income tax amendment in 1913 and, except for brief periods,
without an effective central bank until the same time could not
possibly have the pretension of claiming to be a modern regulatory
state before then, and not until actual experience with an administered economy during World War II did it become plausible for
Americans to think of national regulation as central to their common identity. So the late date makes sense and regulation and direction of an economy means law and lawyers.
Now, I have no stake in what choice legal historians as a class
make as to when the twentieth century began. My own interests
are securely within any plausible date. But it is important to note
that everyone is missing the point: What is central to American
law for these years... race, the economy, international adventure,
or the nation state? And, this choice will both focus research for
the next generation and indicate for what neglect we will be indicted by the following generation.
All of which is not to say that I do not have a preference. I
like the later date. As a pure twentieth century person, whenever
I find myself on the front end of The Great War, things seem foreign. I actually think that that impression is enough to decide the
question, but it also seems that the other candidates are flawed.
The race issue was so successfully suppressed before World War II
that, however central it is in fact, it is so peripheral in consciousness as to lead to fundamental tail and dog problems. International adventure is similar. It is so important that it masked the
decline of the basic industrial might of the United States for approximately forty years after the Depression. Yet, the notion that
Foggy Bottom is peripheral to America's identity, "that those furriners are little more than pesky mosquitoes," is so deep in Americans that to create a viable international issue it has to be blown
completely out of proportion, as have been the Russian Bear, the
ayatollah or the Sandinistas. The economy is almost the reverse; it
is almost too compelling a focus. Here, I think, economic considerations lead to two stories. The first is the growth and control of a
national industrial economy before the Depression. The second,
starting immediately thereafter, is a relative unwillingness to control the growing technological, financial, and service economy and
a shift to governmental tending of the disorderly decline of the industrial economy. This change, both in the economy and in the
role of law, suggests to me an underlying shift in our understanding of things legal such as would undermine the obvious continuity. That leaves the growth of the nation state's apparatus,
growth which created consciousness of the long surpressed question of race, which turned international adventurism into a big, lucrative legal business and which presided over the creation of a
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current role for government in the economy. Thus, I would focus
twentieth century legal history on that theme and so what follows
by the way of more detailed survey reflects that choice-to the obvious detriment of this essay.
The gentle reader who has had the patience to go this far will
by now surely wonder what holds the two pieces of this essaymethod and periodization-together, especially since it is now time
to discuss what I know and how much I do not know about twentieth century legal history. The connection is the lawyer, probably
the key participant in the socialized intellectual history that I
maintain is legal history and the key, neglected actor in legal history "of the period" to date.
I put the matter bluntly. Just what have lawyers done all
day? And how has it changed? As long as these baseline questions
go unanswered we shall never come close to knowing the more important why? For so-called private practice we have essentially no
baseline after Daniel Webster's Boston (Konefsky, 1982), except
for Bob Gordon's continuing work on corporate lawyers in the
Gilded Age, which will create another island of knowledge
(Gordon, 1984). But thereafter all is darkness except for
Auerbach's still devastating portrait of the organized bar (1976)
and some bits of biography (Auerbach, 1973; Harbaugh, 1973) until
contemporary sociology takes over. Curiously, we know a bit more
about the more public practices of law. From Peter Irons' work
(1982) and biographies of New Deal figures such as Douglas (Simon, 1980; see also Douglas, 1974), Frank (Glennon, 1985) and
Landis (Ritchie, 1980) we know a little about the more elaborate
forms of government administrative practice, at least in times of
relative crisis. Here the long hours, short tempers and sense of euphoria remind one of contemporary accounts of lawyers in takeover battles.
We tend to know a little bit more about lawyers' constitutional litigation, largely because of Brown v. Board of Education.
Tushnet's work (1987) gives us a good picture of the NAACP strategy (see also Meier, 1976) and a needed sense of the chaotic nature
of "grand" strategy. Elman's recent memoir (1987) and other
sources (Kluger, 1975) shed some light on the federal government's activities in the case, though in all of this there is the problem of Felix Frankfurter. That problem, simply put, is that of all
public lawyers' work, we know most about that of being a
Supreme Court judge, and simultaneously much of what we know
is highly suspect. Part of the problem is the real secrecy surrounding the institution, but a good deal of it can be attributed to Felix
Frankfurter and his acolytes. As Lash's research (1975) shows,
from the beginning Frankfurter wrote for his biographer and edited his papers with that in mind. Add to this the idolatry he inspired in his clerks and other associates, and his, feuding with
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Black and Douglas (Douglas's papers have clearly been severely
edited with an eye to the same prize), and thus one hesitates to put
trust into any document prepared by an interested party. And it is
still the case that when disinterested parties discuss "the great
man" (Hirsch, 1981; Murphy, 1977, 1982) they tend to get pummeled by partisans. One longs for the sense of frustrated routine
that can be seen in Holmes's correspondence and instead is treated
to the proposition that Black and Douglas's attempt to read the directed verdict for the defendant out of FELA is a momentous policy issue. And the print spilled on Justice Roberts' "switch in
time," a matter of great import to frankfurterians, has similarly
needlessly polluted our rivers and streams (see, e.g., Pusey, 1983).
Thus, in a very real sense we know more about being an appellate judge from Schick's (1970) study of the Second Circuit of
the two Hands, Clark, Frank, Chase, and Swan than from all of
the palaver about the Court, though here a good word should be
said for the anecdotal material of the kind usually scoffed at by
professionals preserved in the yearbooks of the Supreme Court
Historical Society (Gossett, 1976; Knox, 1984; Stone, 1978; Taft,
1976) and the continuing effort to frame a good biography that
avoids hagiography (Gal, 1980; Goldman, 1982; Schwartz, 1983;
Strum, 1984; White, 1982). This is not to say that good work could
not be done on the Court of Frankfurter and Douglas or on earlier
courts (Bickel, 1969). We know that the two men disliked each
other, just as we know that there was no 1924 picture of the Court
because McReynolds refused to be photographed with Louis Brandeis, but what difference did these feuds make? My guess is that it
will take much careful sifting and weighing and years of work,
since the networks of affiliation extend deep into the executive
and judiciary as well as academia, before we obtain any useful information.
One must honestly wonder whether or not that much effort is
worthwhile. Judicial law making has its real patrician fascination,
but I am sure we are much more likely to learn about the federal
assumption of responsibility for economic and social policy by putting time into Joseph Cannon, Samuel Rayburn, Everett Dirksen,
or Lyndon Johnson (Reedy, 1982) and their legal counselors or
into the back rooms of the Department of Justice, the Securities
and Exchange Commission or OPA than by studying the Court for
the same amount of time. Or, consider a neglected but enormously
significant piece of legislation, as Hyman has recently done (1986),
for example, the Highway Act of 1958, which created the Interstate Highway System. That legislation transformed the United
States. It doomed the general merchandise service of the railroads, leaving to them only bulk cargo making regular truck transport easy and cheap. And it opened up vast stretches of the continent to vacationers and more importantly to the out-migration
from urban centers that has become the dominant demographic
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trend of the past decade by making "rural cities" industrially viable in national markets and personally attractive because of their
newly found easy access to the big city and all its charms. Or consider how the various Higher Education Acts beginning with the
National Defense Education Act of 1958 turned college education
from being a requirement for the aspiring professional middle
class into a requirement for the aspiring white-collar lower middle
class, and how the increasing shift from grant to increasingly market-oriented loan programs has shifted student interest away from
the arts, humanities, and social sciences and toward career programs. Looked at from the point of view of the Court, the one
program has some impact on parkland acquisition in urban areas,
(and from the perspective of litigation, generally, on urban redevelopment) and the other a more limited impact on discrimination.
Those are, I suggest, fundamentally distorted understandings that
would be corrected if we spent time looking at how lawyers did
and did not shape those programs from their inception through implementation.
Such assumptions of federal power and concern may often
have significant impacts on private practice as well. Gordon once
speculated that the appearance of the Federal Estate Tax transformed a wills and trusts practice from the creation of dynastic
controls to the avoidance of the tax man's bite. My related guess is
that while boilerplate is still the corporate lawyer's stock and
trade, the Securities Acts and the Corporate Income Tax have
transformed corporate practice since the Korean War and that
their failure to bite before that time is an interesting story. Here
another far better known development, the constitutionalization of
criminal procedure, seems likely to have had less impact on the
practice of criminal law than might have been suspected, given the
picture supplied by the journals and the public press. The plea
bargain was already institutionalized in urban areas by 1930 and
seems not to have changed much since then. What has changed is
the behavior of the organs of public authority, at least a little, and
the cost of real criminal defense, which is out of the reach of most
citizens--except for the indigent and the successful criminal.
Here, then, it is lawyers in their enactment of the routines of practice who create the meaning of these legal initiatives.
One needs to say more than a few words about legal substance, the dominant way of thinking about legal history, whatever
else I may wish were the case. The Constitution, of course, bulks
largest in the literature (and state policy the smallest). One significant question needs great work and has received next to none. If
the significant event in twentieth century legal history is the federal assumption of the central role in setting economic and social
policy, then the question I dismissed earlier, Justice Roberts'
"switch," takes on more meaning. First Ackerman (1983) and now
Gjerdingen (1986) argue that the events of 1937 are a moment of
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foundational politics that signal a transformation in the social and
institutional arrangements of a government (see also Parrish,
1984). They have thus linked these events to the Civil War and
the related constitutional amendments and to Constitution-making
itself. I simply doubt that this is the case, that these events
marked anything more than the temporary capitulation of an economic oligarchy. But, recent understandings of the nature of classical legal thought (Kennedy, 1980)-powers absolute within their
spheres--and the nature of post realist legal thought (Katz,
1979)-balancing-that tend to support my claims about periodization, tend also to support the Ackerman-Gjerdingen claims about
the events of 1937. Just what part has constitutional law played in
forming the legal twentieth century?
One can play out the question in economic matters where I believe my answer is clearly correct. But in questions of civil and
political rights the matter seems to me more difficult. Clearly, in
some deeply perverse way, the crisis of 1937, which signaled a retreat from the Court's interference in economic legislation (until a
new conservative Court grabbed onto federalism), permitted its intervention in First Amendment questions and thus permitted imposition of national standards Congress surely would, and often
did, reject. Similarly, for a time the Court was far out in front of
Congress in criminal procedure, segregation, and representation.
Is the Court's continued insistence on nullification of expressed
public policy, state and federal, or is its action in putting these social questions within the federal domain the more important action or are the two really a part of the same thing, all branches of
the federal government pulling together to create a viable nation
state? I confess to having no firm answer but much curiosity unslaked by any currently available scholarship, much less the kind
of scholarship that would turn the bare doctrinal history into
something meaningful at some level of understanding-legislative,
executive, practicing lawyer, or informed citizen.
Turning away from the constitution at such a grandiose level,
a few less grand matters need to be noted. Work on civil and political rights continues (Capeci, 1986; Ely, 1976; Garrow, 1978; Lofgren, 1987; Martin, 1985; Reitman, 1975; Smith, 1986). Interestingly, we seem to be beginning to remember that there have been
civil rights issues not just for Blacks, but for Asians as well for
some time now (Garrott, 1983), so that a small body of work has
grown on Yick Wo (Kaylor, 1983), the Japanese Exclusion cases
(Irons, 1983; Yamamoto, 1986) and even General Yamashita (Guy,
1981). Similarly, the impact of the freedom of information act has
begun to generate some political rights scholarship centering
around the McCarthy Era loyalty programs and prosecutions
(Markowitz, 1980; Schrecker, 1986), but also going back into earlier
(Irons, 1984; O'Reilly, 1982; Vaughn, 1979; Williams, 1981), later
(Eliffe, 1971) and contemporaneous anti-subversive schemes, such
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as the FBI's emergency detention program (Theoharis, 1978). The
commerce clause, once a staple of constitutional law courses, blissfully seems to have dropped from sight, although here, I must note
one would like to know what all those old tax and transportation
cases were really about.
A little work is finally being done on nonconstitutional areas
of federal law-making. Recent contributions have centered, as one
would expect, on the various New Deal economic policies, including those relating to public works (Reeves, 1973), steel (Shaffer,
1978), oil (Brand, 1983), agriculture (Breimyer, 1983, Rassmussen,
1983), social security (Cohen, 1983), and government finance (Wallis, 1984). Clearly, more work needs to be done here centered on
the shift from the corporativist solutions of the early years to the
more free-market solutions of the later years and especially the
second term. But, even more important is our total lack of understanding of regulation during World War II. My good friend Jim
Atleson insists that mid- to late-twentieth century labor law was
formed not by the NLRB (Gross, 1974) during the war but by the
War Labor Board and its employees (see, Nolan, 1983). These individuals dominated the field as lawyers, arbitrators, and academics
for the next thirty years. Similarly, wartime procurement surely
set the pattern for federal government contracting, a bizarre and
specialized subject, but one, it must be remembered, with enormous economic impact in today's economy. At the same time, federal power initiatives, TVA, Columbia Basin, Hoover Dam, and the
Rural Electrifications Administration, seem to have led nowhere.
Why that is so, other than the lack of effective limit on the federal
borrowing power, is a puzzle, at least to me, although not, I suspect
for Frug (1980), for each legal entity had the potential to be a marvelous governmental unit, neither, state or city, and not really federal either.
At the level of general economic policy there is simply nothing, and bizarrely so. We have a detailed history of the Tax Court
(Dubroff, 1975, 1976, 1977a, 1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1978c), but surprisingly little knowledge of the tax code and how it grew (Witte,
1985). Similarly, we have some knowledge of the continuing call
for a federal incorporation statute (Urofsky, 1982), but little of the
baseline of SEC enforcement and disclosure that has served as a
queer substitute now for forty years; some knowledge of Thurman
Arnold's tenure at the Anti-Trust Division (Ayer, 1971; Gressley,
1977; Miscamble, 1982), but none of anti-trust policy more generally, seen as anything other than a string of Supreme Court opinions, and such basic dimensions of economic policy as the Federal
Reserve System, the Comptroller of Currency and the Treasury
Department, much less such obscure initiatives as TNEC, have
come to no one's attention. What we need is a good book-length
history of federal economic policy broadly construed from which
more specialized work might be done.
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Little is known about so-called social policy either. Some people know bits and pieces of the Works Projects Administration
arts projects and even the simply wonderful state guidebooks, but
little else is known of the greater projects or the parallel Civilian
Conservation Corps. Did the legal form of these enterprises make
any difference or would any way of distributing federal money
have worked as well? Then, while we know something about unemployment (Garraty, 1986) and retirement (Graebner, 1980),
although much good work is being done on labor generally (e.g.,
Montgomery, 1987; Tomlins, 1985) there is also Wage and Hour
and Minimum Wage and Prevailing Wage legislation. Now all of
this is economic regulation as well, just as is social security or
worker's compensation, the staples of old-fashioned social legislation courses. Indeed, it is not until in the Eisenhower years when
the nation had to construct a school desegregation policy (Bass,
1981; Belknap, 1987; Schwartz, 1986) that a largely noneconomic
social issue appears (however, see Schweber, 1981). Here the peculiar structure of our federal government of limited powers may
bite hard, for general social legislation, outside of the ambit of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the commerce clause, is said to be impossible absent an appropriation program on which to condition it.
Growth of these appropriation vehicles that covers such marvelous
creations as the NSF and the NEH needs to be investigated.
The other great social policy program is environmental health
and safety where interesting islands of knowledge appear (Ball,
1986; Graebner, 1976; McEvoy, 1986). Here the levers have been
more diverse, essentially because many of these issues are workplace or product safety and thus more susceptible to commerce
power regulation. There is, of course, a trade-off involved, or so it
might seem; commerce power means economics and susceptibility
to cost benefit analysis, a matter fateful to any social program because if the program were cost-effective then industry would adopt
it, or so Mr. Posner would teach us. Has this difference in legal
form amounted to anything as the nation's social agenda has
changed? This question seems an important focus for any historian of the movement that began with meat and poultry inspection
and drug licensing.
Turning away from the federal government to state and local
governments and social and economic policy, what was a thin literature would have become, but for the work of Teaford (1979, 1984,
1986), a largely nonexistent one. I doubt that this is because the
states are about to become appendages of the Federal Reserve Districts or local government, the equivalent of French administrative
departments. The sheer daunting nature of the task of coping
with forty-eight or more jurisdictions is enough to silence any researcher. And yet, as Hurst has shown, work in even a single state
can be very rewarding and often is. (Buroker, 1970; Hailer, 1970;
Lurie, 1972; Pisciotta, 1985).
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A careful look at state and local law-making is important because in several areas-schools, family relations and land use come
immediately to mind-federal policy is still limited and may remain so, and because, as is currently being demonstrated in the
area of economic development, when federal initiatives decline

such governmental units end up taking in the slack. Too little significant work has been done in these areas, though note should be

made of interesting discussions of the origin of the public authority
(Fetner, 1977) and of the certificate of public convenience and necessity (Jones, 1979), some basic work on state policy toward mu-

nicipalities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
(Teaford, 1979, 1980) and on state legislative responses to declarations of unconstitutionality during the same years (Lindgren,
1983).
At the end of this brief trip through the twentieth century
where are we? First, I have not exhaustively surveyed the literature so that all unmentioned work is to be consigned to the nether
world of the casenote. Any survey of this kind is necessarily selective and this one has been explicitly so. I have ignored most work
outside my chosen focus and that more than fifteen years old. I
have also ignored general political history, both from political
scientists and general American historians. This literature, while
not directed at the legal historian's narrow concerns, often has
much to offer. Second, I have not exhaustively surveyed the literature, even under my own choice as to what twentieth century
legal history is or might be about. For example, nothing has been
said about the one subject I know something about, legal education
and legal academics. Third, I have completely ignored the available sub-themes that would deepen and enrich any portrait of the
twentieth century, and there are many. Let me mention only two
that are not obvious (to me at least) from my earlier depiction of
possible themes.
It seems to me that at the same time that there has been the
growth of a great national regulatory apparatus together with the
enormous lawyerly attempt to avoid that apparatus, there has been
a relatively continuous attempt to use law not in the interest of national regulation but of local exceptionalism, often paradoxically,
an imitative local exceptionalism. I believe this can be seen clearly
in the use of the legal tools for urban development where the emphasis is on preserving (and thus creating) the unique Buffalo,
which is patterned on the unique Baltimore, which is patterned on
the unique Boston. This strong countercurrent wishes to deny the
national nature of the American state. Lawyers participate in this
countercurrent and through their work, the doing of law, give it
shape, form, and content by the use of legal words. What the relationship of this countercurrent is to arcadian themes in American
culture, themes pushed in the political rhetoric of both the right
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and the left, is not obvious to me, but is at least a matter worthy of
some exploration.
A second countercurrent, backwater (or what have you), is the
problem of legal thought in general. Put bluntly, and here Ackerman is clearly correct, whatever the momentary stasis that legal
process theory brought to legal thought in the fifties and early sixties, there has been no coherent theoretical foundation for law
since the realist movement. Theorizing about law is in total chaos
now and has been for approximately sixty years. That fact may be
irrelevant; in one sense law seems not to mind. At the same time,
that fact may be very important; how people think about their
world limits, as well as creates, the possibility of legal action.
Which is the case, and how we got to this state of affairs, is potentially an important, or at least interesting, topic about lawyers,
legal academics, other academics, public pundits, and the ideas
each uses that seems to me at least to have only a marginal relationship to the nation state and its direction of our welfare.
Other countercurrents could be identified, but it is more important to recognize a fifth limit to this exercise in review. I have
not worked out in general, much less in convincing detail, the relationship between lawyers as intellectuals making things happen
with words, the growth of the nation state and legal history. That
is the task of the unwritten legal history of the twentieth century.
Nor do I harbor any illusions that this piece will finally put the
nail in the coffin of doctrinal legal history. The pull of the idea of
law as rule, whatever its source or sources, is too great. Still, I am
confident that if one keeps the line between history and casenote
tolerably firmly in mind better legal history will be written.
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL is Professor of Law at the State University of New York, Buffalo School of Law. He holds a J.D. from
the University of Chicago (1967).
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